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LANGUAGE AND THE "LAW": JURISPRUDENCE
AND SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
GENERAL SEMANTICS
By JULIUS PAUL *
W HEN the word "law" is used in ordinary discourse, what does it mean
to us? What specifically does it refer to? How do we react to its usage,
and to other similarly abstract legal terms such as "rule of law," "legal right,"
"law and order," "due process of law," and "clear and present danger"?
These, and many other legal words and phrases, are but part of that immense
area of jurisprudential myth that the late Felix S. Cohen called the "trans-
cendental nonsense" of the law.'
The problem of language and the "law" is certainly not a new one, and
many contemporary writers in the field of American jurisprudence have at-
tempted to study the problems of legal behavior in terms of general semantic
principles. For example, Thurman W. Arnold wrote:
" 'Law' is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important social sym-
bols. It develops, as language develops, in spite of, and not because of, the
grammarians .... " 2
And, in a similar vein, Professor Edmond N. Cahn wrote:
-.. . Symbols are the girders of society, fitted together to maintain a rational
order, shifted or torn apart when new symbols promise a higher eminence." 3
In jurisprudence, the nemesis of our study is nearly always the question:
what is (the) "law"? This question usually assumes that the "law" (or just
plain "law") is more than a maze of legal concepts or rules, and that the term
"law" is a label (even if it is a kind of catch-all) for some specific referent.
But what specific referent? Or set of referents? Here are some common
* A.B., University of Minnesota, 1947; Ph.D., The Ohio State University, 1954. Assistant
Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University. The substance of this article was contained
in a paper delivered at the Second Conference On General Semantics of the International Society
For General Semantics at Washington University (St. Louis).
1 ... Our legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is to say, concepts which
cannot be defined in terms of experience, and from which all sorts of empirical decisions are sup-
posed to flow. Against these unverifiable concepts modern jurisprudence presents an ultimatum. Any
word that cannot pay up in the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be declared bankrupt, and we
are to have no further dealings with.. . . Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 2 Etc.: A Review of General Semantics 82, 93 (winter 1944-1945); repr. from 35 COL.
L. REV. 809 (1935).
2 THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935).
2 THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE; AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW 60 (1949).
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examples of the wide variety of difference in the field of jurisprudence over a
simple definition of the term "law":
AUSTIN: The command of a political sovereign.
KELSEN: The higher (transcendental) rules or norms that govern the legal
order.
POUND: The institutional basis for an ordered society and for the maintenance
of social control.
SAVIGNY: The historical evolution of an instinctive sense of right possessed
by all races of mankind.
HOLMES: What the courts do in fact, not what they say they do.
FRANK: Holmes' definition, plus the behavior-patterns of the individual judges
and jurors.
BEALE: The multifarious legal rules that guide judges in judicial decisions.
LLEWELLYN: What government officials do about disputes.
EHRLICH: The traditional set of mores or value judgments of a particular
community.
RABELAIS: (Judge Bridlegoose): The results of cases decided by the throwing
of a pair of dice.
The obvious difficulty, from the point of view of general semantic
analysis, is the enormous differentiation in the definitions of the term "law"
and the complete failure to achieve some kind of agreement on the ground
rules for using this term in legal as well as non-legal discourse.
What is the source of this confusion? Primarily from the attempt to
describe an institution,' in conjunction with or apposite to a set of legal rules,
a set of facts, and/or a particular legal situation. Or, is it that some writers
on "law" are prescribing a set of ideal legal rules when they use the term
"law" or "the law" or even "Law"?
If ever logomachy was rampant, this is the place! The failure of most
writers to distinguish the legal what is from the legal what ought to be is, of
course, an old bugaboo, but it is nonetheless inexcusable. And even when
this distinction is made, the problem arises as to whether the study of legal
4 ". .. The trick is to find a pair of polar words, in which the nice word justifies your own
position and the bad word is applied to the other fellow.
"How may the observer of social institutions avoid such traps? The answer is that in writing
about social institutions, he should never define anything. He should try to choose words and
illustrations which will arouse the proper mental associations with his readers. If he doesn't succeed
with these, he should try others. If he ever is led into an attempt at definition, he is lost.
ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 169, 182-83 (1937).
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"reality" (the province of what is commonly called "legal realism" in Ameri-
can jurisprudence) excludes the "oughtness" or ideal elements of all legal
activity.
The late Judge Jerome N. Frank, one of the foremost legal realists, called
the overuse and misuse of legal language, "verbomania." He wrote that,
. . . Word-consciousness may deliver us from primitivity in thinking by en-
abling us to look beyond our speech forms to the things we are talking about." r
This is a call for the application of the general semantic principle of
"extensional" orientation (reliance on and a pointing to specific and clear-cut
referents) to the use of legal language.
In short, when the word "law" is used (or "legal right" or some other
abstract legal term), do we refer to a past decision or set of legal rules or
principles, or to a future decision 'or set of legal rules, or to what we (sub-
jectively) feel ought to be the correct decision or ruling principle in a specific
case? The problem can be summarized in the following way:
(1) "Law" can mean all things to all men. It usually does, and this
breeds terrible confusion. Sir Ernest Barker, an outstanding English political
philosopher, is not a sloppy writer, but semantic confusion seems to be an
inextricable part of both political and legal philosophy. For example, Sir
Ernest wrote:
. . .Legal action-we may also call it 'political', for, as it will be argued
later, the political is also the legal, since the State is essentially law . . . Law,
in a word, is a general mode of action which ranges over all places where a
uniform rule is possible, and which touches, as it ranges, every sort of
thing . . .".6
But let us return to the language of actual decisions. Since the results
of specific decisions have important meaning for those who are concerned
with the outcome of legal cases, the language of a specific decision should be
clearly understood by everyone connected with the case. In respect to this
problem, Jerome Frank wrote:
"The legal word-skeptics were engaged in a worth-while job. For the mean-
ing of words, as they affect citizens involved in law suits-and any citizen may
be, any day-is fearfully important. Every week, men are hanged or jailed
for life, women are divorced or lose the custody of their children, sons and
daughters lose all they have in the world, labor unions are destroyed, employers
6 LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 87 (1930).
6 PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 45, 82 (1951). In these two short excerpts
(which are taken somewhat out of context), Sir Ernest equates "legal action" with "political,"




become bankrupt-all because of the meaning the courts give to such words
as 'due process', 'income', 'willful', 'reasonable', or 'interstate commerce'.
Our constitutional history is little more than a series of contests about the vo-
cabulary employed by the founding fathers in the Constitution .... 7
Of course, it is true that judicial decisions have all kinds of effects on
the individuals concerned with their outcome, but certainly the initial activity
that leads to a divorce, for example, is not the language of the judge, but some
kind of non-verbal or verbal "action" that took place prior to a specific case.
In this sense, the words and actions of the judge and jury are always ex post
facto.
Although I agree that the interpretations of the language of the American
Constitution have been an important and vital part of our political and legal
history, only a naive view of American constitutional history would center its
attention on the verbal battles that raged over the meaning of various parts
of the Constitution.
Legislators, judges, legal text-writers, and laymen alike have struggled
(at times bitterly) with the esoteric language of the Constitution and of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for example; but these conflicts not only involved
"the vocabulary employed by the founding fathers in the Constitution", but the
actual clash of men, groups of men, and of ideas.
Sometimes verbal contests were instrumental in provoking bloody con-
tests. But whenever the battle over words took place in our constitutional
history, the ideals and aspirations of individuals and of groups were part of
that history, and the words employed by the participants were but tools that
could be used in almost any fashion for the fulfillment of desired ends.
(Perhaps the dramatic events at Little Rock in the fall of 1957 are a case-
in-point.) The "action" components of history should not be ignored, al-
though admittedly the words used are part of that historical "action".
Frank believes that there will always be some confusion over the uses
of legal language because of the element of contingency and the inherent
inexactitude of most legal activity. In regard to statutory interpretation, he
wrote:
"The difficulty, however, is not primarily with the lawmakers; it lies in the
impossibility of foreseeing all the situations which may arise in the future to
which the words of the statute may .be applied .... ,8
7A Lawyer Looks at Language in HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN ACTION 329-30 (1941 ed.).
Frank's last sentence would probably cause some consternation in the circles of American legal
philosophy, but he is not alone in his assertion. For a monumental recent study of the meaning
of the language of the Constitution, especially the interstate commerce clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment, see WILLIAM CROSSEKY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953).
8 /d. at 331.
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A more extreme example of the no-man's-land of legal terminology can
be found in a statement made by the late Professor Arthur L. Corbin, a leading
expert on the law of contracts. In writing about the language of contracts, he
said that ".. .. Words have no meanings; it is the users of words who give
them meanings.. " There is a ring of truth in Corbin's statement, but
this still leaves undone the job of putting meaning into legal language. If
legal words and phrases have no intrinsic or even provisional meaning, except
that of their users, then the problem of language and the "law", is, in this
writer's opinion, utterly hopeless.
(2) Methodologically, "law" can refer to tangible objects (e.g., officials,
court buildings, jails, etc.), or to metaphysical principles (e.g., "natural
rights", "justice", "rule of law", etc.).o The legal realists of the New Juris-
prudence in America say that the only data of importance to them is what
courts do in fact, not what judges say, or what laymen feel or think about
"law". Legal "reality" to the legal realist excludes the values, aspirations,
and social ideals that men attach to the term "law" or to the "legal order" in
whatever fashion or form. (This is a broad generalization that would do
injustice to those legal realists who are more modest and humble in their
approach, for even the late Jerome Frank had a passionate regard for the
civil rights of individuals and spent a lifetime suggesting ways for making
the legal order a more "just" one.)
(3) "Law" can be functional or descriptive in its usage-what is some-
times called "pragmatic" jurisprudence-or teleological (purposive), depend-
ing on the user's motives and his particular use of legal language.
Thus, the field of jurisprudence has much to learn from general semantics,
especially its first principles. For example, here are some rules of caution that
might be of some use to those who employ legal language:
(a) When using the term "law" and other legal terms, define and
describe what is being discussed, insofar as this is possible, in some kind of
extensional frame of reference. (e.g., the efforts of the legal realists and
others in the various fields of the social sciences, who are constantly searching
for more accurate and precise terminology.)"
9 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 58 n.65 (1951).
10 See "La' and "the Rule of Law" in WELDON, THE VOCABULARY OF POLITCS 61-69
(1953).
11 "'.. The object of a realistic legal criticism will be not the divine vision which follows
the words 'Be it enacted:' but the probable reaction between the words of the legislature and the
professional prejudices and distorting apparatus of the bench, between the ideas that emerge from
this often bloody encounter and the social pressures that play upon enforcing officials. Words are
frail packages for legislative hopes. The voyage to the realm of law-observance is long and danger-
ous. Seldom do meanings arrive at their destination intact. Whether or not we approve of storms
1958.]
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(b) If "law" refers to an additional set of terms or concepts, then these
terms or concepts must be clearly defined and differentiated from the term
"law" or term that is initially employed. (e.g., the term "law" can mean
something quite different from the term "the law" or "Law". "Jurisprudence"
is another term that can refer to "law" or "Law" but can mean something
quite different from either of these terms.)1
2
(c) The use of the term "law" or any other abstract legal word or phrase
in situation I is not the same as the use of "law" in situation II (e.g., using a
particular legal term, phrase, or concept such as "reasonable man" in two
separate cases involving different circumstances; nor is a particular legal term
or concept in situation I (case-1954) the same when used in situation II (case-
1957).
For example, the use of the doctrine of "clear and present danger" has
been extremely varied, mainly because this doctrine is hard to define, except
in terms of particular cases, sets of facts, decisions of individual judges, and
the surrounding circumstances that make each case unique. This doctrine or
rule is used in cases involving the "police power" (the protection of public
health, safety, and morals) of the states and of the national government and
the Constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment. The terms "clear",
"present", and "danger" must all refer to a specific case, and each term
comprises a unique aspect of this rule of American constitutional law.
The "clear and present danger" rule has never been used in exactly the
same form by judges such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learned Hand, Louis
D. Brandeis, and Fred Vinson, nor did the late Justice Holmes use it in
the same way in every case where it was pertinent to the decision. The par-
ticular case with its unique set of facts, the reactions of the individual judges,
and the time and place and social milieu, all affect the use of a legal doctrine
such as this one."3 We need only to remind ourselves of the outburst of dis-
and pirates, let us be aware of them when we appraise the cargo." Felix Cohen, Ethical Systems and
Legal Ideals; AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 240 (1933). See Arnold
Rose, Sociology and the Study of Values, 7 BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1 (1956) for a pene-
trating analysis of the problems involved in using and defining values.
12 E.g., in a first degree murder trial in Columbus, Ohio, Judge Joseph M. Harter charged the
jury: "I know it is not pleasant but someone has to do this job to make this system of American
jurisprudence work." Ohio State Journal, May 20, 1954, p. 1, col. 8. This is indeed a strange use
of the term "jurisprudence."
13 See Robert Cushman, "Clear and Present Danger" in Free Speech Cases: A Study in Judical
Semantics, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY; Presented To George Sabine 311-24 (Konvitz and
Murphy ed. 1948). Also, see in opinions in Dennis et al. v. United States, 314 U.S. 494 (1951).
The question of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights is another area
of difficult definitions and interpretations. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Morrison, The judicial
Interpretation, 2 id. 174 (1949); Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection
of the Laws, 50 COL. L. REV. 131 (1950).
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cussion over the Supreme Court's meaning of "equal protection of the laws"
in the 1954 Public School Segregation Cases to realize how difficult and agoniz-
ing the interpretation of terms such as these can be. 4 And there are a host
of other variables in the picture, most of them harder to define and to measure.
Extensionalization in the use of legal language and in legal practice is not
easy to accomplish.
(d) "Law" as a "map" (as a descriptive tool of analysis) should be
carefully distinguished from its use as a "territory" (as the area for description,
whether it is a set of facts or metaphysical ideals). "Law" can be described
and can be used in the sense of both "means" and "ends" (e.g., when used
by Roscoe Pound, "law" refers to the institutional mechanisms that create
and maintain a stable society. To the nineteenth century analytical jurist,
"law" referred to a given set of legal rules that became and end in itself.
From the point of view of the political scientist, "law" might refer to the
end-result of the legislative process).
(e) The level of analysis on which we use the term "law" and other
legal terms is, it seems to this writer, extremely important. Here, Korzybski's
"structural differential" is a useful tool in jurisprudence, for there are so many
different levels of abstraction in the use of legal terms such as "law" that
the user should be careful to distinguish not only his unique definition of the
terms he employs, but also the level of abstraction that he is referring to.
The symbol "etc.", the use of index numbers, specific dates and places, par-
ticular cases and decisions, quotations, and a careful pointing to and description
of the referent in mind, can all help to unmask much of our confusion in the
field of language and the "law"."
The most important reminder is that whenever legal language is used,
extensionalization should be employed as much as possible. This, in my
opinion, is the modus operandi between a complete abolition of these trouble-
14 Cf. the following critical attempts at analyzing this decision: Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955); Cahn, A Dangerous Myth in
the School Segregation Cases, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955); Harris, The Constitution, Education,
and Segregation, 29 TEMPLE L.Q. 409 (1956); Swisher, Dred Scott One Hundred Years After,
19 J. POL. 167 (1957).
15 A more extreme solution was suggested by United States Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas at a writer's conference in 1956: "I'd advise anyone who wants to write to stay away
from the law." As quoted by the Associated Press in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 29, 1956,
#1, p. 21A, col. 3. Chief Justice 0. Otto Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court told the Denver
Bar Association that lawyers ought to use simpler words and shorter sentences. "I've got to use a
dictionary in reading some of your legal briefs. And too much of that becomes embarrassing." As
quoted by the Associated Press in the Southern Illinoisan, October 10, 1957, p. 17, col. 5.
1958.]
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some legal terms (which Jerome Frank and others have suggested),' and the
current status of legal terminology in statutes as well as in jurisprudential
literature.
This miasma of semantic confusion is neither endless nor hopeless. But
anyone who uses terms such as "law" must be careful as well as belligerent.
For confusion, even if it is innocent, over the use of such terms as "law" can
lead to some mighty heady consequences.
16 Frank would throw out such words as "law" and "legal realism" because they create too
much confusion. He felt that it would be better to state clearly what he was talking about, i.e., what
courts do, are expected to do, can do, and ought to do; in short, to extensionalize without employing
the word "law." This is the method he followed in COURTS ON TRAIL (1949), and in many of his
own opinions as a Circuit Court judge.
